Logical inference is often seen as an exclusively human and language-dependent ability, but several nonhuman animal species search in a manner that is consistent with a deductive inference, the disjunctive syllogism: when a reward is hidden in one of two cups, and one cup is shown to be empty, they will search for the reward in the other cup. In Experiment 1, we extended these results to toddlers, finding that 23-month-olds consistently approached the non-empty location. However, these results could reflect non-deductive approaches of simply avoiding the empty location, or of searching in any location that might contain the reward, rather than reasoning through the disjunctive syllogism to infer that the other location must contain the reward. Experiment 2 addressed these alternatives, finding evidence that 3-to 5-year-olds used the disjunctive syllogism, while 2.5-year-olds did not. This suggests that younger children may not easily deploy this logical inference, and that a non-deductive approach may be behind the successful performance of nonhuman animals and human infants.
Introduction
Philosophers and cognitive scientists have long debated whether nonhuman animals and prelinguistic infants have a language of thought that is qualitatively different from our own. One difference that has been proposed is that animals and infants may be much more limited in their ability to combine information flexibly or to think abstract, combinatorial thoughts (e.g. Carruthers, 2002; Penn, Holyoke, & Povinelli, 2008; Premack, 2007; Spelke, 2002) . On this hypothesis, animals and infants may lack the ability to represent logical concepts like the OR and NOT of classical logic, think logically structured thoughts like ''A OR B", and make deductive inferences like ''A OR B, NOT A, THEREFORE B". Logical concepts are deeply combinatorial -they represent nothing but the relationship between other constituents of thought. They are also deeply abstract -the hallmark of logical inferences is that they are valid regardless of the specific content that they instantiate. Logical inferences and the representations that make them up are therefore strong candidates for being represented in an abstract, combinatorial language of thought that animals and infants may not possess.
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In this paper, we focus on one simple logical inference, the disjunctive syllogism: A OR B, NOT A, THEREFORE B. The disjunctive syllogism requires representing a disjunctive OR between two possible states of affairs: either one or the other is true. When one possibility is ruled out with NOT, this information can be combined with the disjunction to generate novel information: the other possibility must be true. To make this inference, it is necessary to represent -or at least implement -the concepts OR and NOT as defined in classical, propositional logic. While adults can clearly make inferences that are beyond the scope of classical logic -for example, those involving quantifiers, modal operators, graded probabilities, or degrees of belief -concepts with the meanings of classical logic's E-mail address: shilpa@wjh.harvard.edu (S. Mody). 1 The question of whether infants and animals have the capacity for logical inference is independent of the theoretically important questions of how these inferences are represented and computed. See, for instance, the debates between mental model theorists (e.g. Johnson-Laird, 2010 ) and natural deduction system theorists (e.g. Braine, 1978; O'Brien, Braine, & Yang, 1994; Rips, 1994) . Here we are concerned with the orthogonal question of when logical capacities emerge in ontogeny. For simplicity, we primarily use the language of natural deduction in this paper, but our proposal applies equally to a mental model conception. On this latter story, the difficulty that children may face in reasoning by the disjunctive syllogism is not in manipulating or combining propositional thoughts, but in implementing those thoughts into mental models that are properly structured and evaluated -this is sketched out in further footnotes. 
